Reports

Most Americans oppose cutting Medicaid and Medicare in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act: 68% and 76% of all Americans disapprove of cutting Medicaid and Medicare, respectively.

• Broad disapproval of reductions to Medicaid and Medicare transcends traditional socioeconomic and political divides.

• Majorities of Republicans disapprove of Medicare cuts (64%) and Medicaid cuts (51%). In terms of disapprove to approve ratio, Republicans disapprove of Medicare cuts 4:1 and Medicaid cuts 2:1.

• For Medicare, 83% of those aged 55 to 64 and 89% of those 65 and older disapprove of cuts.

• Among households with income under 50k, over 70% disapprove of cutting Medicaid.

• Individuals with lower levels of formal education disproportionately express strong objections to reductions in both programs.

• Respondents who oppose cutting Medicare decreased their approval of Trump by almost 5.4 percentage points more than respondents in favor of cutting Medicare.

● Artificial intelligence has reached a tipping point in American society: half of U.S. adults (50%) report using at least one major AI tool. State-level adoption is widespread, with every state except West Virginia (33%) reporting usage levels of at least 40%.

● Expectations of workplace disruption are nearly universal, with substantial majorities across all 50 states anticipating AI will impact their jobs within five years, suggesting that Americans recognize AI as a transformative force that will reshape the economy and society. In every single state, the percentage of people who are concerned about too little regulation outweighs those who worry about too much regulation.

● Yet, with more than one-third remaining uncertain about appropriate regulatory approaches, Americans have not formed settled views on AI governance. Regulatory attitudes vary geographically, but they do not follow the nation’s usual red‑blue divide.

● Geographic patterns reveal coastal knowledge economy hubs like California, New York, and Massachusetts, along with Sun Belt states such as Texas, Georgia, and Florida, leading in anticipated workplace AI impact, while agricultural Corn Belt and Rust Belt regions from Iowa to West Virginia report lower expectations.

● The data expose deep demographic fault lines, with younger, more educated, higher-income Americans driving AI adoption while rural, older, and lower-income populations lag substantially behind.

● ChatGPT dominates the AI landscape with 65% recognition and 37% usage rates, but a consistent pattern emerges across all AI tools: awareness significantly outpaces actual usage of the tools, and everyday frequent usage remains concentrated among a small fraction of users.

● Americans who disapprove of the administration’s science-related policies outnumber those who approve by more than two to one. On average, 48% disapprove or strongly disapprove of recent government actions in that space, while only 21% approve or strongly approve.

● The most negatively viewed actions are the pause in public health information dissemination (51% disapproval) and the firing of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) employees (50% disapproval).

● Approval levels for individual actions are low;only the dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (29%) and the layoffs at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (27%) received more than 25% approval.

● Average approval of science-related government actions is highest among Republicans (42%), men (28%), graduate degree holders (30%), and high-income respondents (31%). Disapproval is strongest among Democrats (74%), African Americans (56%), women (53%), and those aged 65 and older (55%).

● A majority of Americans support greater government investment in research: 57% favor increased medical research funding and 42% support increased scientific research funding. Relatively few want funding cuts: only 10% for medical research and 16% for science.

● Even among Republicans, nearly half (48%) favor more medical research funding, though only 31% support increases in science research funding. A quarter of Republicans support cuts for scientific research and 15% for medical research.

● While support for research remains strong, the proportion of Americans reporting high trust in scientists declined from 58% in2020 to 36% in 2025, with sharper drops among Republicans (from 54% to 26%) than among Democrats (from 67% to 50%).

● Despite declines in public confidence, scientists and doctors remain more trusted than most institutions, including Congress, the Supreme Court, and the news media.

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TikTok has emerged as a major challenger to the current Meta-dominated social media landscape, capturing about 10% of all attention of American users. In contrast, we estimate that Meta social media and instant messaging properties capture about 48%.

• TikTok users skew far younger than for most other social media. TikTok is also used by more non-White respondents; people with a high school or less education, and moderately, if consistently, by more women than men, and Democrats than Republicans.

● Friends and family (29%) and news media (26%) are the top sources Americans use for voting information, with younger people (18-24) leaning more on personal networks, and the older population (65+) favoring news media.

● Americans with less formal education tend to rely more on friends and family for election information, while those with higher education and income are more likely to prefer the news media.

● Democrats and Independents are more likely to rely on news media (29%), whereas Republicans more often get information from friends and family (34%).

● Local media serve as the main election information source for 8% of Americans, while national media are preferred by 17%. Three quarters of Americans identify sources other than the news media as their main way of staying informed about the 2024 election.

● Older Americans, as well as those with lower income and education, are most likely to rely primarily on local news for 2024 election information.

● Across US states, the reliance on national news for election information is highest in Connecticut (26%), Massachusetts (26%), and Nevada (25%), while the states where people are most likely to rely on local news are Hawaii (14%), Louisiana (13%), and South Carolina (12%).

● Only 25% of Americans report being very or extremely satisfied with local political news, with satisfaction levels relatively higher among Black respondents (35%), Democrats (38%), and people living in urban areas (33%).

● Americans with higher income and formal education levels are more likely to report being satisfied with local political news.

● DC (48%), New York (42%), North Carolina (33%), Pennsylvania (33%), Michigan (31%), and Illinois (30%) reported highest satisfaction with local news about politics (percent respondents saying they were “very” or “extremely” satisfied).

● Conversely, Montana (50%), Idaho (49%), Wyoming (45%), New Mexico (45%), and New Hampshire (40%) were most dissatisfied with local news (percent respondents saying they were “not too satisfied” or “not at all satisfied”).

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• In the presidential election, AAPI respondents across the country and across Southern states preferred Vice President Kamala Harris over former president Donald Trump, more so than the general population did: 48% of AAPI respondents in the South preferred Harris, compared to 35% from that region more generally, while 50% of AAPI respondents nationally chose Harris, versus 31% for Trump. Nationally, the general population was roughly split, with 40% for Harris and 38% for Trump.

• AAPI respondents in the South were roughly split over whether Trump handled the job well when he was last president, with 40% saying they approved to some degree, compared to 43% saying they disapproved.

• However, AAPI respondents nationally disapproved of Trump’s handling of the job by a greater degree (48% strongly disapprove or disapprove, compared to 34% strongly approve/approve.) In this survey, the general population was also split, with 42% saying they strongly approved or approved of Trump’s performance, versus 41% disapproving.

• Asked to rate parties and candidates by degree of favorability, AAPI respondents nationally were more favorable to Democrats (61 points average on a 1-100 scale) than Republicans (52 points.) Southern AAPI respondents rated Donald Trump (60 points) higher than Joe Biden (54 points), but lower than Kamala Harris (65 points.)

• Compared to the general population, slightly fewer AAPI respondents in the South and nationally reported feeling “very safe” in their home. Among the general population, 55% said they felt very safe in their home, versus 49% among Southern AAPI respondents and 48% among AAPI persons nationally.

• 48% of AAPI respondents in the South and 51% of AAPI respondents nationally said that the way U.S. politicians talk about China may contribute to stereotypes either a lot or a fair amount. 40% of the general population also believed this to be the case.

• A national sample of U.S. persons of MENA (Middle Eastern and North African) descent (see below for precise definition) favored Vice President Kamala Harris (56%) over former president Donald Trump (32%).

• MENA respondents nationally ranked the economy, inflation, healthcare, and crime at the top of their list of issues affecting their decision for president.

• The MENA respondents favored Harris heavily on some domestic issues such as abortion: 62% said Harris would definitely or probably handle the issue better, compared to 26% who said Trump would definitely or probably handle better. However, MENA respondents rated abortion as only the 12th most important issue out of a list of 17.

• On handling the economy, 53% of MENA respondents said Harris would definitely or probably handle it better compared to 35% for Trump.

• Regarding the Israel-Gaza conflict, 50% said Harris would definitely or probably handle the issue better compared to 33% for Trump. For MENA respondents, this was the third-least important issue among a list of 17 issues.

• Generally, the MENA sample systematically rated all policy issues as more important than the general population; the biggest gap was for race relations and racism, followed by climate change, where the MENA respondents found the issue significantly more important than the general population.

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• Among the top election issues for North Carolinians were the economy, inflation, health care, and taxes. Issues such as gun control and abortion ranked significantly lower than economic issues.

• 74.5% of North Carolina voters indicated that they intended to vote, while 21% – 1 in 5 – were not sure if they would vote or indicated they would not vote.

• 61% of North Carolinians said that it was somewhat or very difficult to afford healthcare costs.

• 43% of respondents indicated they had ever received a medical bill with an error in it.

• About one-third (32%) of survey respondents in North Carolina said they had had to resort to using a credit card in order to cover medical costs they did not have enough money to cover.

• Near three-quarters (74%) of respondents said they were somewhat or very concerned about surprise medical bills.

• The general public in the United States has limited awareness ofcurrent events in Haiti, with just 9% saying they are very familiar and31% saying they are somewhat familiar with the current crisissituation in that nation.

• More people support increasing migration from Haiti than oppose it:34% of the general U.S. public somewhat or strongly supportsallowing more people from Haiti to immigrate, while only 29% of thegeneral public said they are somewhat or strongly opposed.

• A slight majority of the general public (51%) supports increasing aidto Haiti (based on respondents who said they “somewhat” or“strongly” support aid).

• 44% of Haitian-Americans said they felt the Biden-Harrisadministration’s policies had a positive effect on Haiti. Only 16% ofHaitian Americans felt that Biden-Harris policies had a negative effect.

• Persons of Haitian descent reported more favorability for Democrats,President Joe Biden, and Vice President Kamala Harris than thegeneral public did. They also indicated higher favorability forRepublicans, compared to average respondents.

• Regarding the debunked election campaign-driven story relating toimmigrants in Springfield, Ohio, eating pets, 62% of the generalpublic said they had heard about it.

• For those respondents who indicated awareness of the false “eatingpets” story, 69% recalled that it referenced Haitian immigrants, while18% were not sure. About 9% of respondents in total – nearly 1 in 10– falsely recalled that immigrants from four entirely different, butspecific, countries had been accused of eating pets: Mexico, China,Kenya, and Russia.

• American Jews expressed acute concern over issues of antisemitism in the United States, with 54% saying it is a “very serious” problem compared to only 27% of non-Jews who held the same view.

• On the issue of Islamophobia, Jewish Americans voiced much more concern than non-Jews, with 40% saying it is a “very serious” problem compared to only 25% of non-Jews expressing such high levels of concern.

• When asked whether they would support restrictions “prohibiting speech that opposes Israel’s existence as a Jewish state” on college campuses, Jews were significantly more likely to support such speech bans, with 39% of Jews and 21% of non-Jews strongly or somewhat in support.

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• American Jews are much more likely to indicate that they will vote for Vice President Kamala Harris than for former President Donald Trump, preferring her by a margin of 2:1 (60% for Harris, and 30% for Trump.)

• On Israel-Gaza issues, 27% of Jews and 28% of non-Jews said Trump would definitely handle the situation better, while 36% of Jewish respondents said Harris would handle the situation better, compared to 25% of non-Jews in the survey.

• American Jews in the survey saw Trump as strongly pro-Israeli, more so than non-Jews did. A majority of non-Jews (56%) believed Harris offers equal support to both Israelis and Palestinians, compared to 42% of Jews who believe Harris is even-handed.

● Almost one in four American adults (about 23 percent) report knowing someone who struggles with opioid addiction, while one in seven know multiple people

● Knowing someone who is addicted to opioids is significantly more likely in rural than in urban areas (29% versus 20%)

● Opioid addiction appears to cross partisan divides: we find small partisan differences in knowing someone addicted to opioids

● West Virginia stands out as the most affected state, with 47% of respondents indicating that they know at least one person addicted to opioids

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We compared the voting preferences of respondents who had previously participated in the April-May wave of CHIP50 to those of the same individuals reported during the week following the June 27 US presidential debate. Our results indicate a modest churn of voters’ preferences, with no substantial shift in the race between Biden and Trump.

2024 is the first time since 1892 that an incumbent President is facing a predecessor. This yields a potentially distinct dynamic. Elections may be viewed in significant part as an act of assessment of the incumbent, per Reagan’s famous query: are you better off than you were four years ago?1 The choice confronting the American voter in 2024 is, in a sense, a comparative assessment of two presidencies, that of Biden and that of Trump. CHIP50 has been tracking the approval of Biden and Trump for the last two years.

KEY FINDINGS

● Approval of both Biden and Trump has been low and fairly stable for the entire period, with more people disapproving than approving of both for the last two years.

● Approval of Trump has been higher than approval of Biden for the entire period. Disapproval of both was about the same in June 2022. However, Biden’s disapproval has slightly increased, while Trump’s disapproval has gradually declined during this time, yielding a substantially lower disapproval rate for Trump currently (43%) than for Biden (52%).

● The largest shifts towards Trump and away from Biden in approval have been in the younger cohorts. For example, for the 18 to 24-year-old cohort, the percentage of people disapproving of Biden has jumped from 40% in June 2022 to 57% now, while the disapproval of Trump has dropped from 55% to 42%.

● The shift in approval of Biden and Trump has been matched by a substantial shift in partisanship towards Republicans in the youngest cohort. In June 2022, Democrats had a 46% to 21% advantage in partisan identity; this has dropped to a 38% to 32% margin.

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How Do Americans Feel About Israel, Palestine, Jews, And Muslims?

Much has been made about young Americans’ reactions to the war between Israel and Hamas, as well as its implications for antisemitism and Islamophobia. A series of polls from October and December 2023, for example, reported that those between 18 and 24 were split 50/50 on whether they supported Israel or Hamas. In fact, this result gained so much traction that candidate for the GOP nomination for president, Vivek Ramaswamy cited it at a campaign event in November 2023. However, national surveys usually lack the sample size to confidently report percentages of small subgroups, like 18 to 24 year olds, raising questions about the validity of findings like these. Between December 21, 2023 and January 29, 2024, we surveyed 30,460 individuals aged 18 and older across all 50 states plus the District of Columbia. We included feeling thermometers for Israel, Palestine, Jews, and Muslims, asking people to separately rate how they feel about each group on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 indicates feeling very unfavorable or cold, 50 indicates not feeling particularly warm or cold toward that group, and 100 indicates feeling very favorable or warm. Our survey’s sample size allows us to zoom in on subgroups within the population. For instance, it included 3,294 Americans between ages 18 and 24. This allows us to look within this age group and break young Americans down by partisanship, as our survey includes 1101 18-24-year-old Democrats and 676 18-24-year-old Republicans. In this report, we examine how responses to these four thermometer ratings varied by age, race, education, religion, and partisanship, as well as how the different thermometer scores are correlated with one another. 

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KEY FINDINGS

• Young Americans were less likely than older Americans to rate Israel favorably, but they still rated Jews highly. 18 to 24 year old Americans, for example, rated Israel at a 40/100 but Jews at 71/100. While ratings of Jews and Israel are correlated overall, the correlation is significantly weaker for younger Americans, relative to older ones. 
• Across all demographics, respondents rate Jews higher than Israel and Muslims higher than Palestine, but these gaps vary. The Civic Health and Institutions Project: A 50-State Survey (CHIP50) 5
• Democrats ages 18 to 24 rated Israel the lowest at a 36/100, but rated Jews higher than both Republicans and Democrats ages 25 to 44 and 45 to 64 at a 75/100.
• Republicans ages 18 to 24 rated both Israel (49/100) and Jews (66/100) lower than their older Republican counterparts. 
• Respondents with more education rated both Jews and Muslims higher than those with less education. 
• For every age group, ratings of Palestine and ratings of Muslims were positively and consistently correlated. 
• Ratings of Muslims and Jews are not zero-sum; instead, they were strongly and positively correlated; the higher one rated one group, the more likely they were to rate the other one highly as well. It is important to note that feeling thermometers are a blunt measure of how one feels toward a particular group or country, but they are nonetheless widely employed in social science research because of the variation they provide in telling us how cold or warm people feel about various groups.

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Winter 2023-24 has seen an unusual confluence of a variety of respiratory illnesses, ranging from flu to RSV (Respiratory Syncytial Virus) and COVID-19. Between December 21, 2023 and January 29, 2024, we surveyed 30,460 individuals aged 18 and older across all 50 states plus the District of Columbia. We asked them if they had experienced an Influenza-like Illness (ILI) defined as experiencing a fever and cough, or a fever and sore throat, and/or if they had been diagnosed with COVID-19, over the previous month. Amongst those who responded yes to such questions, we asked them whether or not they had sought medical attention. In this report, we summarize our findings across a variety of demographic subgroups, including age, race, education, income, gender, and geography.

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KEY FINDINGS

- Approximately 10% of Americans reported experiencing illnesses characterized by cough or sore throat in the month before taking the survey (presumably during December 2023 and January 2024).

- The likelihood of reporting such illnesses varied significantly with age, with younger individuals more frequently indicating they had experienced these symptoms.

- Among those who acknowledged having a fever accompanied by cough or sore throat, about 34% sought advice from medical professionals.

- The inclination to consult healthcare providers also showed age-related variation, with older generations being more prone to seek medical consultation.

- Around 28% of Americans have been tested for COVID-19 since October 1st, 2023, with 6% reporting a positive result. Notably, we do not observe significant variation across age groups in the self-diagnosis of COVID-19.

- Finally, 47% of Americans have received or intend to receive a flu vaccination for the current season. Older individuals are more likely to report having received the flu shot compared to their younger counterparts.

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● Rates of depression remain highest among those ages 18-24, with nearly half (47%) reporting levels that would be considered sufficient to require further evaluation and possibly treatment. (By comparison, a 2019 survey found rates of 7% among those 18-29, or 21% including mild depression).

● A similar proportion of young adults (44%) report levels of anxiety that could suggest the need for further evaluation.

● These rates are substantially greater than those in older age groups - for example, 32% of those 25-44, and 22% of those 45-64.

● Rates have remained elevated in this age group throughout the pandemic, with 2 spikes - one prior to the 2020 election, and another in summer 2022.

● We see substantial variation in rates of depression among all adults from state to state: Levels of depression are greatest in West Virginia and Alaska, followed by Idaho, Utah, Mississippi, Vermont, and North Dakota. Levels are lowest in Wisconsin and Minnesota.

● There are large differences in rates of depression among young adults; rates are highest in those without a high school degree, those with the lowest levels of household income, and those who are unemployed.

● Young adults who identify politically as Independents were most likely to report depression, followed by Democrats and then Republicans.

● There are also geographic effects among young adults, with more depression among those in more rural settings. Rates of depression are greatest in the West and Midwest, and least in the South.

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Estimating current vaccination rates

This report summarizes vaccination rates in the United States and compares estimates of vaccination rates from the COVID States Project (CSP), the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).

Key Findings

● Vaccination rates for the primary series of vaccinations have plateaued since the Fall of 2021.

● The regions with the highest vaccination rates are the Northeast and the West Coast plus Hawaii. The regions with the lowest rates are the South, and a block of adjacent states in the upper West/Midwest (the Dakotas, Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho)

● Less than a third of respondents report getting the bivalent booster, with majorities in every state reporting not getting the bivalent booster.

● CDC data deviate quite substantially from survey-based measures (CSP and KFF) of vaccination rates. These deviations almost certainly reflect errors in the underlying official records used by the CDC, driven by the inability of states to link records of multiple shots to a given individual. Official data thus offer a distorted picture of the trends in vaccination rates in the country, and where those distortions have grown over time.

We asked respondents to mark popular vaccine and political misinformation claims as true or false. When in doubt, they could also select “Not sure.” Here are some of the patterns we found:

● Overall, 20% of Americans endorsed at least one COVID-19 vaccine misperception. Another 45% did not endorse any misperceptions but did report being uncertain about the veracity of some claims.

● In the realm of politics, a very small proportion of respondents (8%) were able to correctly identify all false statements we asked about as inaccurate. Two-fifths (41%) believed at least one false statement, while just over half (51%) did not endorse incorrect items but still reported uncertainty about them.

● COVID-19 vaccine misperceptions were more common among younger people, with 25% of those ages 18 to 45 endorsing at least one. Both vaccine and political misperceptions were more prevalent among respondents with lower income, lower education level, and among those who identified as Republicans.

● People endorsing vaccine misinformation were considerably more likely to also endorse political falsehoods. Fully 71% of those who believed false vaccine statements also believed inaccurate claims related to politics. In contrast, 32% of those who correctly marked all false vaccine claims believed inaccurate political statements.

● Vaccine-related and political misperceptions were strongly associated with low trust in the government, science, and medicine. They were also associated with high trust in Donald Trump and high levels of conspiratorial thinking.

In our latest survey, 24% of Americans report levels of depression that would typically trigger a referral for evaluation and treatment. Among 18-24-year-olds, that number jumps to 44%, including 24% of 18-24-year-olds meeting the criteria for moderate to severe or severe depression.

• The rate of depression among 18-24-year-olds is slightly down over the last 12 months, and down from its peak at 53% in June 2022.

• Percentages of 18-24-year-olds who say they are avoiding public places, avoiding contact with others, or wearing face masks outside the home are the lowest they have been in any of our surveys since the beginning of the pandemic. However, despite continuing to return to pre-pandemic life, the rate of depression among 18-24-year-olds has not declined in kind.

• Young respondents identifying as gay, lesbian, or bisexual are significantly more likely than older and heterosexual respondents to report symptoms of depression and anxiety and higher levels of stress. Sixty-three percent of 18-24-year-olds identifying as gay, lesbian, or bisexual meet the criteria for at least moderate depression, while 56% report symptoms of generalized anxiety.

• While young people report higher rates of depression across the board, young people with lower household incomes are the most likely to meet the criteria for depression. Forty-nine percent of 18-24-year-olds with a household income of under $25,000 meet the criteria for depression.

• Young women report higher levels of depression, stress, and anxiety than young men.

• Young respondents report higher levels of self-reported stress and anxiety (based on the GAD-2 questionnaire) than any other age group, a finding that has been consistent throughout all of our surveys.

• A substantial subset of respondents between 18 and 24 report some elements of loneliness: Twenty percent say they often feel that they lack companionship, 27% say they often feel left out, and 31% say they often feel isolated from others.

● Comparing our October 2022 survey conducted immediately before Elon Musk purchased Twitter to our December 2022-January 2023 survey, the percentage of Americans who reported using Twitter dropped from 32.4% to 29.5%. This decline was driven by Democrats, 38% of whom reported using Twitter in our survey before Musk took over the company, which dropped to 33% after.

● 53% of Republicans trust Elon Musk to do what is right either somewhat or a lot, compared to just 24% of Democrats.

● Democrats were 15% more likely than Republicans to trust Twitter to do what is right before Musk purchased the site, but trust among Republicans and Democrats converged to equal levels following Musk’s takeover, with 34% of both parties trusting Twitter to do what is right.

● Republicans perceived a significant decrease in bias against conservatives on Twitter and an increase in neutrality after Musk took over, while Democrats saw a significant increase in bias against liberals and a decrease in neutrality since Musk bought Twitter.

1. About half of American adults report having been infected with COVID-19 at some point, with 35% saying they have tested positive for COVID-19 before.

2. Individuals vaccinated against COVID-19 report being sick for fewer days than unvaccinated individuals.

3. Due to the underreported use of at-home rapid tests, the data on reported tests are missing a significant number of positive cases.

4. At least 5 in 6 American adults likely have some level of immunity to COVID-19, either through vaccination or previous infection.

5. A substantial majority of American adults have not received the bivalent booster shot, but a majority of those who have not say they plan to or are open to getting the shot.

6. Antiviral medications are not being heavily utilized, even among higher risk American adults.

7. One in nine American adults report having continued symptoms from COVID-19 more than two months post-infection.

8. Nearly half of American adults are still wearing masks, but only a quarter say they are very closely following the recommendation to wear a mask when outside of the home.

9. Only 28% of American adults have received their flu shot.

10. There is a strong correlation between getting the bivalent booster and getting a flu shot. However, just 1 in 10 American adults have received both shots.

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● Half of the respondents in our survey (50%) were confident that votes in the 2022 congressional elections would be counted accurately. The other half reported no confidence in an accurate vote count (18%), or else said that they were not sure about it (32%).

● A total of 74% of Democrats had confidence in the fair counting of votes, compared to 35% of Republicans and 42% of Independents. Only 8% of Democrats lacked confidence in election integrity, while close to a third of Republicans (30%) did not think votes would be counted accurately.

● Confidence in fair elections increased consistently with higher income and education. Over 60% of those with graduate degrees and income over $100K thought the 2022 elections would be fair, compared to 40% of those with income under $25K and 30% of those who did not graduate from high school.

● While Americans were concerned about election fairness, very few named it among the most important problems facing the country. Only 3% of respondents listed elections as one of the top 3 problems facing the US.

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● Despite being featured less in popular news media, Americans remain concerned about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with 78% reporting that they are either somewhat or very concerned.

● In response to a hypothetical Russian use of nuclear weapons, there was broad bipartisan agreement for an aggressive response, even if it meant more direct NATO or American involvement.

● While Democrats are more concerned about the Russian invasion of Ukraine than Republicans and independents, strong majorities in all three groups report being concerned. Majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents across every age group are concerned about the invasion.

● In the event of a Russian nuclear attack, Republicans and Democrats both indicated support for tightening economic sanctions, increasing military aid to Ukraine, launching missile strikes aimed at taking out nuclear weapons that Russia could use on the battlefield in Ukraine, establishing a NATO-led no fly zone in Ukraine, and sending NATO troops to Ukraine. Very few indicated support for withdrawing all military aid from Ukraine.

● Americans across all age groups are concerned about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but especially those 65 and older, where an overwhelming majority is concerned.

● Women are more likely than men to report being concerned over the invasion. Specifically, Republican and independent women are significantly more likely than Republican and independent men to report being concerned about the Russian invasion. Even so, concern among men is still high, with 75% reporting being somewhat or very concerned about the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

● Majorities of Americans across different levels of education all report concern over the invasion, but more highly-educated individuals are more likely to report being very concerned.

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• Inflation and the economy are Americans’ top ranked problems facing the country headed into the 2022 elections.

• Republicans and independents both rank inflation and the economy as their first and second most important issues, but Democrats rank climate change and racism as their top two issues, with inflation coming in a near third.

• Republicans and Democrats differ significantly in how high they rank immigration, climate change, racism, inflation, and the economy.

• Men and women do not differ as much as Republicans and Democrats in their issue rankings, but women are significantly more likely than men to list healthcare, women’s rights, and abortion as most important issues.

• Among those ages 18 to 24, racism and abortion were the top two most commonly identified most important problems. For every other age group, inflation was the most important problem facing the country.

• African Americans were significantly more likely than any other group to list racism as a most important issue, but Asian-American and Hispanic respondents were also significantly more likely to select racism than White respondents.

• Regardless of whether someone makes under $25,000 a year or over $100,000, inflation was the top-ranked problem for each income group.

• Those who see inflation, the economy, or crime and violence as their top issues are more likely to prefer that Republicans win control of the Senate, while those who see healthcare or racism as among their most important issues are more likely to prefer that Democrats maintain control of the Senate.

• A large majority of Americans quickly became aware of the Mar-A-Lago search. Overall, 81 percent reported that they were aware of the search. Additionally, 82 percent of those who took the survey within a week after the search were already aware of it.

• Overall, Americans approved of the search by a 51-27 margin. Another 22 percent neither supported nor opposed the search.

• Democrats overwhelmingly supported the FBI search of Mar-A-Lago by an 84-3 margin. Over two thirds (69 percent) of Democrats strongly supported the search.

• A strong majority of Republicans opposed the search by a 64-13 margin. Additionally, 47 percent of Republicans strongly opposed the search.

• Independents were nearly twice as likely to support the search as they were to oppose it, with a 47-24 margin. Close to a third (32 percent) of independents strongly supported the search.

• The intensity of Republican opposition to the search decreased slightly as time following the search increased. While Republican support for the raid remained very low in both cases, those strongly opposing the raid dropped from 54 percent of Republicans who responded within a week of the search to 46 percent of Republicans who responded at least one week after the search. Very few Republicans supported the search regardless of when they took the survey, but the percentage of those strongly opposing it dipped over time.

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The COVID States Project has issued a series of reports since the beginning of the pandemic regarding approval of how state governors and the President have handled the pandemic. We also have a dashboard that allows examination of the approval levels of each governor and of the President over time (the latter, both nationally and state-by-state). In this report, we update our discussion of the approval trends, adding analyses of the trends of overall approval of gubernatorial and presidential job performance (which we term “general approval”) and focusing especially on governors seeking re-election. We are at a rare moment where a single issue – COVID – has been the most important issue confronting every governor since they last faced the voters. A key question will be how assessments of each governor’s handling of COVID-19 affects their electoral success. A secondary question is how important approval of an incumbent governor will be for their re-election prospects. (Note that we report all state-level approval data by wave in the appendix.) Some key insights are as follows:

● Average approval of governors’ handling of the pandemic is low (39% for the pandemic; and 40% for general approval). But approval ratings havegenerally held steady since our prior survey wave in June 2022, arresting what had been a long term slide throughout the pandemic.

● Approval of President Biden is also low (37% for the pandemic, and 35% for general approval), but has increased significantly since our preceding wave (by 3 points for the pandemic; and 4 points for general approval).

● Approval ratings of incumbent Republican governors running for re-election are significantly lower than those of incumbent Democrats also running forre-election.

● A major driver of the gubernatorial partisan approval gap is that Republican respondents rate their fellow Republican governors lower than Democratic respondents rate Democratic governors. Important electoral questions are (a) whether this will translate into an enthusiasm gap and (b) how strong a predictor of vote choice job approval will be in 2022.

● A second reason for the partisan approval gap is that Independents tend torate Democratic incumbents more highly than they rate Republican incumbents.

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While Paxlovid has been available since December 22, 2021, there have been challenges in its clinical application. Of people infected with COVID-19 between May and early July, only 11% report having taken antivirals.

● Overall support for abortion across all nine scenarios increased following the Dobbs decision, with increases ranging from 1 to 5 percentage points. Among respondents for whom the abortion issue is “extremely important”, the corresponding increases were larger, ranging from 2 to 8 percentage points. 

● Support for abortion increases or remains the same between the pre- and post-Dobbs periods for all nine scenarios, regardless of intent to vote, but increases modestly more consistently among respondents who are not “very likely” to vote. 

● Across most demographic subgroups, we see little change in the overall probability of voting following the Dobbs decision. There are three exceptions – men, rural residents, and respondents with a high school education or less - each of whom are statistically significantly less likely to say that they are “very likely” to vote in the 2022 midterm election following the Dobbs announcement. 

● Overall, we find that individuals who consider abortion to be an “extremely important” issue are substantially more likely to support Democrats retaining control of both houses of Congress. These gaps, in turn, increase modestly following the Dobbs announcement. For the House of Representatives, the gaps prior to and following the Dobbs announcement are 11 and 14 points in favor of Democrats, respectively. For the Senate election, the corresponding gaps are 12 and 13 points in favor of Democrats, pre- and post-Dobbs, respectively. 

● In the 13 states with so-called “trigger laws” that automatically imposed restrictions or prohibitions on abortion following the overturning of Roe v. Wade, public opinion moved in the opposing direction as public policy – that is, toward greater support for abortion across the nine scenarios – by 3 to 9 percentage points. Such increases were even larger among respondents in those states who indicated that abortion was “extremely important”, with maximum increases in support of 12 to 14 percentage points. 

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● Nationally, roughly one-third of Americans do not offer an opinion on abortion across all nine scenarios. This lack of opinion is lowest for pregnancies caused by rape and for pregnancies that threaten the life of the woman (roughly three-quarters of Americans offered an opinion). 

● Support for abortion to save the pregnant woman’s life outpaces opposition in every U.S. state, with majorities in most states supporting life-saving abortion care. However, residents of states where abortion is legal up to viability are roughly 12 percentage points more likely to support life-saving abortion than in states where abortion is prohibited except for rape or incest (where 55% support abortions to save the life of the woman). 

● Laws prohibiting abortion without exception for rape are clearly at odds with public opinion of those states’ residents. A 55% majority of residents in states where abortion is currently banned without exception for rape or incest support abortion in pregnancies caused by rape. Just 17% oppose abortion in rape cases, with the remaining respondents not voicing an opinion. 

● In every U.S. state, more Americans oppose than support abortion after fetal viability, the prior point at which states could prohibit abortion established in Roe and Casey but recently struck down in Dobbs. Even in states where abortion is legal without gestational limits (AK, CO, NJ, NM, OR, VT, and DC), opposition to abortion after fetal viability is more than double the share that supports such abortions (46% oppose versus 21% support, with the remaining respondents not voicing an opinion). 

● In states where abortion is banned after 6 weeks of pregnancy, 37% of residents oppose abortions after 6 weeks compared to one-quarter (25%) who support such abortions – a 12 percentage point gap. Roughly 4 in 10 (38%) did not voice an opinion. Although not a majority of residents in these states, more residents say they oppose than support abortion in these cases, demonstrating some consistency of the law with opinion of these states’ residents. 

● In states where abortion remains legal, more residents support abortion if a woman does not want to be pregnant than oppose. For people in states where the future of abortion legality is uncertain, roughly equivalent shares support, oppose, and have no opinion about abortions for women who don’t wish to be pregnant. 

● Around half of Americans support abortion if the fetus could suffer from serious health problems or birth defects, compared to around two out of five Americans who oppose it. States with populations most opposed to this stance tend to be in the South - where it is not legal to get an abortion for fetal abnormalities in many states - while majorities in some northeastern states support abortion under these circumstances. 

● Nationally, around twice as many Americans support abortions when the woman’s health is endangered (44%) than oppose it (21%). In many southern states where this is not legally allowed, like Mississippi and Alabama, around equal shares of the population support and oppose abortion when a woman’s health is jeopardized (around three in ten support and oppose). Other states that do not allow this, like Idaho and Utah, have populations that support versus oppose this measure by two to one or higher. 

● Nationally, women overall, Hispanic women, young women, liberals and Democrats are most likely to rate abortion as an “extremely important” issue. 

● Nearly half of Democrats (48%) versus over one-third of Republicans (36%) rate abortion as “extremely important” – a 12 percentage point gap. Similarly, a 53% majority of those who self-identify as liberals rate abortion as “extremely important” compared to 39% of self-identified conservatives – a 14 percentage point gap. 

● Compared to the national average, support for abortion is significantly higher across each of the nine scenarios among individuals who found the abortion issue to be especially important. 

● Regionally, the Northeast consistently contains the highest support for abortions across all scenarios, followed by the West coast and parts of the upper Midwest. The South tends to be least supportive, followed by the great plains and the northern mountain states. This vaguely - with many exceptions - mirrors the gradient of policy restrictiveness by region. 

To see all the charts in one place, please go to this Interactive Charts page.

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● When given a list of possible information sources consulted for child health or vaccine information, parents most commonly selected news and the government followed by television, Facebook, and YouTube.

● Parents most commonly discussed child health and vaccination decisions with their own parents, in-laws, and other relatives when given a list of sources by researchers.

● When we gave parents an open-ended response question about where they got information to decide whether to vaccinate their kids against COVID-19, health care professionals were the most commonly cited source of information overall, followed by news, government, and online/social media sources.

● However, parents of vaccinated children ages 5-18 were much more likely to mention health care professionals - as well as the government and schools - compared to those with unvaccinated children ages 5-18.

● Conversely, parents of unvaccinated kids ages 5-18 were much more likely to say their own general research, and their own decisions and values, were important sources in decision-making compared to parents of vaccinated kids ages 5-18. Parents of unvaccinated children ages 5-18 were also more likely to say that they did not know where they got information, or they did not look for or receive information.

● Relatively few Americans (14%) believe false claims about Ukraine – fewer than those who believe false claims about COVID-19 vaccines (18%). Still, as many as 50% of our respondents report being uncertain about the veracity of at least one false claim regarding Ukraine.

● Misperceptions about COVID-19 are by far the strongest overall predictor we have identified of holding misperceptions about Ukraine. Nearly half (45%) of respondents who hold at least one misperception about Ukraine also hold misperceptions about COVID vaccines. In contrast, fewer than one in ten (8%) of those who marked all false Ukraine claims as inaccurate believed any false vaccine claims.  

● Republicans are 5 percentage points more likely than Democrats to believe false claims about Ukraine; the partisan gap is three times larger (15 points) for COVID-19 vaccine-related false claims.

● The most widely-used source of news about Ukraine is social media, cited by 37% of respondents. Of these respondents, 16% hold at least one misperception about Ukraine. In comparison, 25% of respondents cite social media as a source of news about COVID-19. Twenty percent of these respondents hold at least one COVID vaccine-related misperception.

● Americans feel much warmer toward Ukraine than toward Russia, by an average of 60 degrees on a 100-point feeling thermometer (77 vs. 17 degrees). The gap is considerably smaller (+37) among respondents who hold at least one misperception about Ukraine (64 vs. 27 degrees). The gap is also notably smaller for Republicans (+59 degrees warmer for Ukraine) and Independents (+56) than for Democrats (+69).

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● 13% of older Americans are completely unvaccinated against COVID-19, while an additional 14% are fully vaccinated but have not received a booster, and 3% report having received a single shot of Moderna or Pfizer.

● The CDC data on vaccination rates are clearly significantly flawed, because they indicate that there are more older Americans who have received at least one dose of vaccine than there are older Americans. This is because they attribute the boosters (and perhaps second shots) that many people have received to being first shots, likely due to poor vaccination record linkage for those individuals. As a result, CDC data likely understate how many people are completely unvaccinated and how many people have received boosters, and overstate the number of individuals who have received only a single dose.

● The unvaccinated and unboosted are disproportionately less educated, lower-income, rural, and Republican.

● The main reasons cited by older Americans for being unvaccinated were worries about side effects and a lack of trust in the process by which the vaccines were developed, similar to concerns we found in an earlier report on the reasons reported by the unvaccinated for their vaccination decision.

● In the open-ended responses, many of the vaccinated but unboosted indicated an openness to getting a booster but cited obstacles or a lack of urgency to do so.

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● 4 out of 10 American adults know at least one person who died of COVID-19, including 7% who know 3 or more people who died.

● 15% of American adults report that a family member died of COVID-19.

● Black and Hispanic adults are more likely than others to know someone who died of COVID-19 (46% and 45%, respectively, versus 38% for White and 36% for Asian respondents).

● About 1 in 4 U.S. adults (27%) report moderate or greater symptoms of depression, generally similar to rates throughout the pandemic.

● These rates of depression are highest among those 18-24, lowest among those 65 and older.

● Rates of depression vary substantially by state, from a low of 20% to a high of 32%. They remain highest among those who identify politically as Independents, followed by Democrats and then Republicans.

● Among those with a family member who died, rates of depression were 31% compared to 26% among those without a family member who died; these effects were not explained by differences in age, gender, race and ethnicity, income, or U.S. region.

● There are two hopeful observations in our data. First, while rates of depression remain higher among adults in households with children compared to those without, this difference has progressively diminished, and is now less than 5%.

● Second, rates of suicidal thoughts have steadily diminished since May 2021, although nearly 1 in 5 adults (19%) still reports such thoughts.

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The Covid States Project has been tracking trends in executive approval of management of the COVID-19 outbreak throughout the pandemic. We find:

● Generally, there has been a downward trend for approval of all governors since the beginning of the pandemic.

● Republican respondents in particular have trended downwards in their approval of governors. Republican approval of Democratic governors has dropped from a high of 57% in April 2020, to 19% in April, 2022. Approval of Republicans for Republican governors has fallen almost as quickly, from a high of 77% in April 2020, to 44% currently.

● In the early stages of the pandemic, President Trump had notably low approval for his handling of the pandemic, far below the average approval levels of governors. President Biden has generally had approval levels above those of President Trump, peaking in the spring of 2021, and declining steadily since. This decline has been somewhat faster than the decline in approval of governors, reaching a nadir in April 2022 one point below that of the average governor at 38%.

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We asked respondents to mark four popular vaccine misinformation claims as true or false. When in doubt, they could also select “Not sure.” Here are some of the patterns we found: 

● While we observe a decline in believing misinformation since the early days of COVID-19 vaccination efforts in 2021, 16% of Americans still hold vaccine misperceptions. Close to half (46%) are uncertain about the veracity of at least one vaccine misinformation statement. 

● People aged 25 to 44, parents with children under 18, Americans who did not go to college, and Republicans are most likely to hold vaccine misperceptions, with over 20% of the respondents in each group marking at least one misinformation statement as true. 

● Early in the pandemic, people with high socioeconomic status were amongst the most likely to hold vaccine misperceptions. Over time, people with graduate degrees and those with high income made large shifts towards rejecting misinformation. The groups least likely to espouse false claims now include graduate degree holders, Democrats, Asian Americans, and those over 65 years of age. 

● A third of the people who believe vaccine misinformation statements are aware that scientific and medical experts reject those claims as false. Additionally, over a fifth of Americans (21%) are aware that science considers a particular claim to be false, but still say they are not sure whether to believe it or not. 

● People who think they know a lot about COVID-19 vaccines are more likely to hold vaccine misperceptions. Among those who claimed to have expert knowledge, 48% believed false claims compared to only 16% of those who said they knew almost nothing about vaccines. 

● Compared to those with no vaccine misperceptions, Americans who believe misinformation claims are less likely to trust the government, news media, science, and medicine. That pattern is reversed with regard to trust in Fox News and Donald Trump. 

● Vaccine misinformation beliefs, uncertainty about false claims, trust in government and science remain among the most important predictors of getting vaccinated, even after accounting for demographic and other factors. 

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The parent-reported COVID-19 vaccination rate for youth ages 12-18 has very slightly risen from 54% in September 2021 to 57% in January 2022. 

● The parent-reported COVID-19 vaccination rate for kids ages 5-11 has increased from 27% in November 2021 to 36% in January 2022. 

● However, the rise of the Omicron variant over the winter holiday season does not appear to increase the reported likelihood that parents would vaccinate their children against COVID-19; if anything, likelihood of vaccinating kids under 12 decreased between November 2021 and January 2022.1 

● Parental vaccination likelihood for youth ages 12-18 increased from September to November 2021, then stabilized from November 2021 to December 2022 at just over two-thirds of parents expressing likelihood. 

● Partisan gaps have increased from September 2021 to January 2022 - in all child age groups, this gap has widened to over 30 percentage points in the most recent wave. 

● Parents of kids under 5 report the lowest percent likelihood of vaccinating their kids: only 54% of parents with kids under 5 said they would likely vaccinate their children against COVID-19. 

● Significant demographic differences emerge among parental likelihood of vaccinating their kids against COVID-19; these relative cross-subgroup differences roughly hold for all childhood age groups. 

1 Vaccination likelihood is measured via the response to two questions: 1) whether the parent said vaccinating their kids against COVID-19 was somewhat likely or very likely, and 2) whether the parent said their kids already received at least one vaccine against COVID-19. If they said it was likely or that they had already vaccinated their kids at least once, the parents were coded as “likely” to vaccinate their kids.  

● Overall, nearly one-quarter (23%) of Americans say it is “definitely” or “probably” justified to ever engage in violent protest against the government. 10% say it is “definitely” or “probably” justified to engage in violent protest against the government right now. 

● Men, younger Americans, and ideologues (liberals and conservatives) are more likely than women, older Americans, and ideological moderates to say it is “definitely” or “probably” justified to ever engage in violent protest against the government. 

● Although the gap between Democrats and Republicans overall is relatively small (Republicans are just 4 points more likely than Democrats to agree that violent protest can be justifiable), Democratic men are much less likely to say violent protest is ever justifiable than Republican men and Independent men (23% versus 32%). Similarly, Democratic men are significantly less likely than Republican and Independent men to say violent protest against the government is justifiable right now. 

● Republicans and ideological conservatives are most likely to say that violent protest against the government is justifiable right now. 

● Among those who say it is justified to engage in violent protest against the government, most (two-thirds) say that the federal government is an appropriate target. Smaller shares think that their own state’s government (35%), another state’s government (20%), or local government (21%) are justifiable targets for violent protest. 

● Among those who say violent protest is justified right now, Republicans are more likely to target the federal government than are Democrats (71% versus 62%) while more Democrats say violence against their state’s government is justified (43% versus 26%). Independents are more likely than Republicans to say violent protest against their state’s government is justified (38% versus 26%) and are more likely than both groups of partisans to say violence against their local government is warranted. 

● Among Republicans who say violent protest against the government is currently justified, a larger share (37%) say violent protest against their state’s government is justified when that state is controlled by a Democratic governor than those who say it is justified in state’s controlled by a governor from their own party (18%). 

In our most recent wave, out of 10,759 respondents: 

● 63% reported ever having been tested for COVID-19. 

● 18% reported ever having tested positive using any type of test. 

● 4% reported testing positive using an at-home test. 

● 31% of individuals who had a positive test at home did not follow up with a test at their doctor’s office or a testing facility, and thus are likely not captured in official data. 

● We estimate that cases have been undercounted by about 6% on average among adults, and likely more so for demographics that use at-home tests more heavily (younger individuals, those with higher income and education, Democrats). 

● 64% of Americans use cloth masks, with just 21% saying they use N95 or equivalent masks. 

● A majority (54%) think that the CDC currently recommends N95 masks for all Americans. Note that these data were collected prior to the CDC’s change in guidance of January 14, 2022, which “Clarified that people can choose respirators such as N95s and KN95s.” 

● Democrats, vaccinated individuals, Whites, those with higher incomes, and respondents with more education are more likely to incorrectly identify N95s as the CDC’s recommended mask-type. 

● Roughly two-thirds (66%) of Americans correctly identify N95 masks as more protective than cloth masks, while roughly one-quarter of respondents (26%) are unsure of whether cloth or N95 masks offer the wearer more protection. 

● Vaccinated individuals, Democrats, those with more education, higher incomes, Whites, and older Americans (50 and above) are more likely to correctly say that N95s offer greater protection than cloth masks. 

● The vast majority of healthcare workers perceive misinformation to be negatively influencing both patient decisions to get vaccinated against COVID-19 (72%), and patient care during the pandemic (71%). 

● A sizable plurality of healthcare workers - around a third - perceive misinformation as an “urgent” problem for patient healthcare during the pandemic, and also as the single most important factor influencing unvaccinated patients’ decision not to get the COVID-19 vaccine. 

● The most commonly cited sources of misinformation negatively impacting patient healthcare, according to healthcare workers, are social media (73%) - particularly Facebook - as well as family and friends (64%). 

The COVID states project conducted a survey and issued a report in the immediate aftermath of the storming of the Capitol building on January 6, 2021. Here, we revisit some of the opinions regarding January 6th, a year later. 

• Overall, 30% of respondents indicated that they had received a COVID-19 booster shot. 

• Older respondents are much more likely than their younger counterparts to have received a booster shot, with respondents over age 65 four times as likely as Gen Z respondents (ages 18-24), by 53% to 13%. 

• Democrats are more likely than Republicans to have received a booster shot (33% vs. 27%). However, partisanship is a far less strong predictor of having received a booster shot – either nationally or comparing Democratic and Republican-leaning states, contingent on having previously been vaccinated – than of having been vaccinated in the first instance. 

• As education increases, the probability of having received a booster increases (from 22% among respondents with a high school education or less to 46% among their counterparts with graduate degrees). 

• We find only small differences in the probabilities of being vaccinated or having received a booster, as well as in respondents’ reasons for getting a booster, before vs. after the WHO Omicron announcement. 

• Nearly half (47%) of previously vaccinated respondents are booster hesitant or resistant. 

● The biggest concerns for parents have consistently been the long term side effects of the COVID-19 vaccine on kids, and whether the COVID-19 vaccine has been tested enough for kids; for every wave of our survey, over half of all parents mention these as major concerns. 

● A handful of groups continued to hold elevated levels of certain concerns from September to November, such as Republican, Asian, and rural parents. Some others (like Democrats, Hispanics, older fathers) returned to the lower initial (June) levels for most concerns after the September spike. College educated parents have stayed at essentially stable (and low) levels of concern over time for almost all concerns examined. Overall, these trends not only suggest that groups are polarized over COVID-19 vaccine concerns for kids, but also that certain groups are still polarizing over time - particularly vaccine novelty and risk for long term side effects of the vaccine. 

● Overall, parental concerns over the COVID-19 vaccine for kids were the lowest in June 2021, peaked in September 2021, and then decreased somewhat in November 2021. 

● Republican, Black, and rural parents, as well as younger (under 35) mothers and parents who say they are unlikely to vaccinate their children, are among the groups with the greatest proportion of people expressing various concerns. 

● College-educated and Democratic parents, as well as parents who will likely or who have already vaccinated their kids, have consistently been among the groups with the fewest expressing concerns. Fathers - particularly fathers 35 or older - also tend to have some of the lowest levels of parental concerns. 

● Large majorities of Americans, overall, across parties and demographic groups are concerned with how history is being taught in schools. 

● In a survey experiment, we find that Americans express greater support for teaching “how racism continues to impact American society today” than support for teaching “Critical Race Theory (CRT)” in public schools. Overall, a 52% majority of Americans support teaching the legacy of racism versus just 27% who support teaching CRT. 

● Support for teaching CRT and the legacy of racism varies widely by socio-demographic factors. Democrats are roughly 50 percentage points more likely to support teaching the legacy of racism than are Republicans. A smaller gap, 37 percentage points, separates partisans in their support for teaching CRT. 

● Despite the increased focus on persistent racial disparities in American society following the 2020 murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police, a majority of Whites do not support teaching how racism continues to impact American society today in public schools. Just 46% White respondents support teaching the legacy of racism, compared to 73% of Black respondents – a 27 percentage point gap between the racial groups. Black respondents were also 19 points more likely to support teaching CRT than White respondents (42% vs 23%). The racial divide is mostly driven by exceptionally low support among White Republicans, whereas there is no significant difference between support for teaching the legacy of racism and support for teaching CRT between White Democrats and Black Americans overall (most of whom identify as Democrats). 

● The public’s attitudes toward CRT have no consistent relationship with state policy on CRT. Opposition to CRT is identical in states that have enacted legislative bans on CRT and in states where no state action has been taken. 

● Despite its prominent place in news headlines in recent months, most Americans don’t know what CRT is. A large majority of Americans are not at all or not very familiar with CRT, with 7 in 10 respondents saying they aren’t familiar with the theory. 

● When asked how well they think CRT describes how American society works, about 1 in 5 (21%) of respondents say it describes society well, 35% think it does not, and 44% say they don’t know. As with support for CRT, state policy on CRT has no clear relationship with citizen’s familiarity with the theory nor with how well they think CRT describes American society. 

● Overall, roughly 1 in 5 (22%) say they voted in a school board election in the past year and 4% said they attended a school board meeting in the past 6 months. 

● Partisans were more likely than independents to say they voted in a school board election, as were wealthier respondents, those with higher education, and older Americans. Similar shares of parents and non-parents report voting for school boards. 

● Majorities of school board meeting attendees were parents of minor children, Democrats, college educated, and below age 50. 

● Overall, the most frequently cited issues motivating school board voters were school safety and requiring COVID-19 vaccines. Together, pandemic-related concerns (vaccines, masks, and mode of instruction) motivate 3 in 10 voters while school safety and mental health combined are the top concern of 1 in 5 voters. 

● The top issue concerning school board voters varies by partisanship, race, vaccination status, and age. Democrats, those vaccinated for COVID-19, and older Americans were more likely to cite COVID-19 vaccine requirements as their top issue for school boards. Younger and Hispanic voters were more likely to prioritize mental health than older and non-Hispanic voters. Black voters and Republican voters were more likely to rank teaching about race/racism as their top issue compared to White voters and Democratic voters. 

● Parent-reported COVID-19 vaccination rates of youth ages 12 to 18 have plateaued between September and November 2021, with 55% reporting that their children receiving at least one COVID-19 vaccine as of November, compared to 54% in September. While such vaccines only recently became available for younger children, 27% of parents with kids ages 5 to 11 have reported their children receiving at least one dose. 

● Despite the surge of children vaccinated since June, the proportion of vaccine-enthusiastic parents (parents who have either had their children vaccinated, or say they are likely to do so) has dropped since June, 2021, from 64% to 57%. 

● College-educated, urban, Democratic, Asian, and older parents are more likely than average to report that their child has already been vaccinated. Rural, Republican, Independent, non-college educated, and younger parents are less likely. 

● College-educated, Democratic, and Asian parents, as well as fathers, on average report a higher likelihood of vaccinating their children against COVID-19. Vaccination likelihood is lowest among Republican parents and younger mothers. 

● According to our November 2021 survey, roughly half (54%) of Massachusetts residents approve of Baker’s overall performance as governor. However, Baker’s support continues to come mostly from outside his own party: Over 6 in 10 (64%) Democrats and 46% of independents approve of Baker, compared to about one-third (35%) of Republicans. Baker also performs better among more educated Massachusetts residents and those with higher incomes than among those with a high school degree or less and those with lower incomes. 

● Baker’s overall job approval (54%) is higher than the average gubernatorial approval across the U.S. of 42%. 

● When it comes to handling the pandemic, Baker again receives higher marks than the national average (58% vs. 45%), although his COVID-19 approval has dipped significantly since his high of 80% in April 2020. 

● Approval of Baker’s handling of the pandemic declined significantly since September 2021, driven mostly by a steep decline in approval among Republicans. 

● Approximately half of all enrolled university students attend institutions with some type of COVID-19 vaccine mandate. 

● Students with Democratic state governors, students at private institutions, and students at medium- to larger- sized institutions are more likely to report having vaccine mandates at their university. 

● A little over two-thirds of students stated that they knew their university’s COVID-19 vaccine policy, and around two-thirds of these students accurately characterized their institution’s policy. In other words, only around half of all university student respondents surveyed accurately knew their university’s policy. 

● University mask and student/faculty/staff vaccination mandates garnered the highest student approval rate for their school administration’s handling of COVID-19 vaccinations. 

● College students who were required to attend any in-person classes were less likely to approve of their school’s handling of COVID-19 vaccinations. 

● Republican college students and unvaccinated college students were less likely to approve of their institution’s handling of COVID-19 vaccinations. Hispanic students and White students were generally less approving than Black students and Asian students, and approval did not vary by gender. 

● All investigated parental concerns about vaccinating children against COVID-19 have increased significantly from June 2021 to September 2021 across all demographic groups. A few of these jumps were as high as 15 percentage points or more for certain concerns and for demographic groups. 

● Certain groups of parents are more likely to express major concerns about the COVID-19 vaccine for their kids, including younger mothers, parents of younger children, parents of children who have not yet been vaccinated, Republicans and Independents, Hispanic and Black parents, the non-college educated, and rural residents. 

● Long-term effects of the COVID-19 vaccine, followed by whether the COVID-19 vaccine has been tested enough, were often the top concerns among parents. 

● Both the likelihood of vaccinating children under 12 and vaccination status in children ages 12 to 18 are strongly related to parent vaccination status, as well as student mode of school instruction. 

In mid-August 2021, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (C.D.C.) issued a recommendation for both vaccinated and unvaccinated Americans to begin wearing masks in public again, particularly in places experiencing outbreaks of COVID-19, driven by the Delta variant. Further compounding this concern is the lower propensity of unvaccinated individuals to wear masks. For example, a report from July 2021 found that unvaccinated Americans, on average, tended to wear masks less than vaccinated Americans by a margin of 25 percentage points. 

● Despite a drop in President Biden’s approval rating on the pandemic since June (overall and among key groups), Biden maintains a higher coronavirus approval rating than did Trump at this point last year (49% vs. 34%). 

● President Biden’s approval rating on his handling of the coronavirus pandemic (49%) and the average governor’s approval rating on their handling of the pandemic (45%) are similar. This is in contrast to President’s Trump’s approval rating on coronavirus at this point last year, which was significantly lower than respondents’ approval of their governor’s handling of the crisis (34% vs. 48%). 

● Governors of states with prohibitions on vaccine mandates garner the lowest approval ratings. This relationship holds even after accounting for partisanship, race, gender, vaccination status, the governor's party, and the state's average per capita COVID-19 cases. 

● Governors of states with higher average COVID-19 cases per capita receive lower approval ratings than governors of states where cases are lower. 

In our previous reports on healthcare worker's vaccination rates and attitudes, we found that their behavior was a harbinger of trends in the general population. The historical data serves as evidence that because healthcare workers had priority access to vaccines their vaccination rates have been consistently higher compared to non-healthcare workers. These data suggest that nationally, vaccine mandates for healthcare workers have had, at most, a modest impact. 

● Overall, public support for federal, state, and local governments requiring that everyone get vaccinated remains very strong, at 65%. 

● Support for narrower mandates for returning to in-person school (63%) or university (68%) or getting on an airplane (71%) also remains high. 

● Six in 10 respondents support requiring large companies to require that their employees be vaccinated or regularly tested for COVID-19. 

● Public support for such mandates has modestly increased (by 1-2 percentage points) since June/July, both overall and in specific circumstances, like getting on an airplane and returning to school or a university. 

● Majorities of respondents -- in most instances large majorities -- support every mandate we surveyed across nearly all partisan and demographic subgroups we investigated. The notable exception is Republicans, among whom fewer than half support an overall mandate (43%), or narrower mandates for kids attending in-person school (41%), returning to university (47%), or for employees of large businesses (35%). A bare majority of Republicans (51%) support mandating vaccines to get on an airplane. 

● Majorities of respondents in nearly all states and the District of Columbia support all four types of vaccine mandates we consider. At the high end, majorities in every state support mandating vaccines for getting on an airplane, while at the low end, majorities of respondents in 45 states and the District of Columbia support requiring vaccination for children to return to school. 

● The biggest expressed concern of the unvaccinated is the safety of the COVID-19 vaccines. 

● The unvaccinated are much more likely to be skeptical of the efficacy and safety of vaccines more generally. 

● A relatively modest share of the unvaccinated have logistical and cost concerns; but among the unvaccinated but vaccine willing, logistical and cost concerns loom substantially greater. 

● Underlying many of the concerns regarding the COVID-19 vaccines is a lack of trust in the institutions that oversee and vouch for their safety. 

● Trust in relevant institutions is strongly associated with vaccination rates at the individual and state levels. 

● Healthcare workers are currently more vaccine enthusiastic than the general population, although prior to vaccines being available vaccine attitudes of the two groups were nearly identical. 

● From March to July, there has been sharp decreases in vaccine resistance across all demographic subgroups. 

● As of July, 27% of healthcare workers are unvaccinated and 15% are vaccine resistant, suggesting that, absent mandates, most of the currently unvaccinated health care workers will remain unvaccinated, potentially fueling outbreaks in health care facilities. 

● The current surge of cases due to the Delta variant will continue to exert pressure on health care providers to mandate vaccinations for their employees. 

● The most cited major concerns of parents are whether the vaccine has been tested enough (51%), the potential for long-term health effects (50%), and how new the vaccine is (46%). 

● Republican and Independent parents are more likely than Democratic parents to cite whether the vaccine has been tested enough and long-term health effects as a major concern. 

● Mothers are more likely than fathers to rate considerations about COVID-19 vaccinations for their children as major concerns, especially whether the vaccine has been tested enough (58% vs. 44%) and how new it is (52% vs. 39%). 

● Young mothers are more likely than older mothers as well as fathers of all ages to express major concerns with whether the vaccine has been tested enough (62%) and long-term health effects (60%). 

● Large gaps exist between parents based on educational attainment. Parents with some high school education are 28 percentage points more likely to cite whether the vaccine has been tested enough as a major concern than parents with bachelor’s degrees (68% vs. 40%). 

● Parents in the lowest income bracket are most likely to cite whether the vaccine has been tested enough (62%) and long-term health effects (59%) as major concerns. 

We asked respondents to mark four popular vaccine misinformation claims as true or false. When in doubt, they could also select “Not sure.” Here are some of the patterns we found: 

● Twenty percent of Americans report believing at least one vaccine misinformation statement. More than half (51%) say they are not sure whether to believe at least one false claim. 

● Belief in vaccine misinformation is associated with lower vaccination rates and higher vaccine resistance. Among respondents who did not mark any misinformation items as true, 70% reported being vaccinated, while 15% were vaccine resistant. Among those who thought multiple misinformation statements were true, 46% said they were vaccinated and 42% were vaccine resistant. 

● Uncertainty about misinformation is also linked to lower vaccination rates and higher vaccine resistance. Among respondents who identified all four misinformation claims as false, only 5% were vaccine resistant and 85% were vaccinated. Among those who did not identify any claim as true but were uncertain about at least one, 25% were vaccine resistant and 56% were vaccinated. Among respondents who thought at least one of the false statements was accurate, 39% were vaccine-resistant and 44% were vaccinated.

● Misperceptions and uncertainty emerge as important predictors of vaccine attitudes even when we account for other factors including geography, demographic characteristics, political affiliation, trust in institutions, news consumption, and personal experience with COVID-19. 

● People aged 25 to 44, those with high socioeconomic status, and Republicans are most likely to hold vaccine misperceptions, with over 25% in each group marking at least one misinformation statement as true. 

● Women, African-Americans, young people, and those with lower socioeconomic status are most likely to report uncertainty as to whether misinformation statements are true or not. 

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● On average, Americans have warmer feelings towards people who are vaccinated against COVID-19. On a thermometer scale from 0 to 100 degrees, the average feeling towards people who are vaccinated is 78 degrees, versus 45 degrees for those who are not vaccinated. 

● In particular, people who are vaccinated themselves tend to report an average of 86 degrees towards others who are vaccinated and 35 degrees towards those who are not. In contrast, those who are not vaccinated feel the same towards other people regardless of vaccination status, reporting an average of 64 degrees for both groups. 

● Among partisans, Democrats and Biden voters, feel warmest towards people who are vaccinated (85 degrees average) and coldest towards those who are not vaccinated (38 degrees average). However, even Republicans and Independents feel substantially warmer towards vaccinated individuals than they do towards the unvaccinated (average difference of 22 degrees for Independents and 17 degrees for Republicans for feelings towards people who are vaccinated compared to people who are not). 

● Americans over 65 report the coldest feelings towards people who are not vaccinated (average 36 degrees) and warmest towards people who are vaccinated (average 85 degrees), compared to all other age groups. 

● Overall, public support for federal, state, and local governments requiring that everyone be vaccinated remains very strong, ranging from 61% to 70%, depending on the specific type of mandate. 

● Public support for such mandates has increased since April/May, both overall and in specific circumstances, like for getting on an airplane and returning to school or a university. 

● These over-time increases in support emerge across nearly all partisan and demographic subgroups we investigated. 

● Majorities of respondents in nearly all (45+) or all states and the District of Columbia approve of all four types of vaccine mandates we consider.